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Local Government Law
by Ken E. Jarrard*
I. ANTE LITEM NOTICE

During the Survey period,1 the Georgia Court of Appeals again considered the essentials of a sufficient ante litem notice, and it emphasized
the importance of substance over form. In City of Greensboro v. Rowland,2
property owners brought action against the* City for inverse condemnation, trespass, intentional tort, and nuisance arising out of the City's construction and maintenance of a drainage project. The City moved to dismiss, arguing, among other things, that property owners failed to provide
the City with adequate ante litem notice. 3 It is well settled that only "substantial compliance"4 with the ante litem requirement is necessary, as
long as the information provided affords the City "notice of the general
character of the complaint, and, in a general way, of the time, place, and
extent of the injury."5 As such, because the property owners in Rowland
had previously issued to the City two letters setting forth their complaints, the court held that sufficient information had been provided to
"substantially comply" with the ante litem statute.6 The property owners

* Founding Partner of Jarrard & Davis, LLP, Cumming, Georgia. Middle Tennessee
State University (B.S., 1990); University of Tennessee, Knoxville (M.P.A. 1992; J.D., cum
laude, 1995). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Tennessee.
Special thanks to the following for their contributions: Larry W. Ramsey, Esq., Elizabeth M. Whitworth, Paul B. Frickey, Esq., Sarah B. VanVolkenburgh, Esq., G. Aaron
Meyer, Esq., Jesse A. Van Sant, Esq., Jeffrey J. Costolnick, Esq., Molly N. Esswein, Esq.,
Sam P. VanVolkenburgh, Esq., and Jeffrey M. Strickland, Esq.
1. For an analysis of Georgia local government law during the prior survey period, see

Ken E. Jarrard, Local Government Law, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 67 MERCER L. REV.
147 (2015).
2. 334 Ga. App. 148, 778 S.E.2d 409 (2015).
3. Id. at 148, 149, 778 S.E.2d at 411.
4. Id. at 151, 778 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting Simmons v. Mayor & Aldermen of Savannah,
303 Ga. App. 452, 454, 693 S.E.2d 517, 519 (2010)).
5. Id. at 151, 778 S.E.2d at 412 (quoting Owens v. City of Greenville, 290 Ga. 557,
561-62, 722 S.E.2d 755, 760 (2012)).
6. Id. at 152, 778 S.E.2d at 413.
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had placed the City "on notice of the general character of the complaint"
and "in a general way, of the time, place, and extent of the injury."7
Compare Mayor & City Council of City of Richmond Hill v. Maia,8 in
which the court of appeals held that a mother's ante litem notice to the
City following her daughter's suicide was insufficient to place the City on
notice of any of the claims brought on behalf of her daughter's estate,
even though the notice specifically identified itself as "the requisite presuit ante litem notice."9 In Maia, the plaintiffs daughter attempted suicide and, during the related police investigation, City police officers photographed the daughter's injuries. 10 Following an officer's reported release of those photographs, the daughter committed suicide." The
plaintiff, individually and as administratrix of her daughter's estate,
brought an action against the City for wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and pain and suffering. 12
The City did not dispute ante litem notice as to the plaintiffs wrongful
death claim brought by the surviving parent, but it argued that the ante
litem notice was deficient for all claims brought on behalf of the daughter's estate because it failed to reference the daughter's estate or identify
the mother as administratrix. 13 The court agreed and held that the ante
litem failed to present the City with sufficient information to "determine
whether any such claim [on behalf of the daughter's estate] should be
settled without litigation." 14
The court further held that substantial compliance with the ante litem
statute15 requires notice that "must contain sufficient information so that
the City can investigate the injuries alleged and determine if the claim
should be settled without litigation." 16 Even though the plaintiffs notice
specifically stated "it was the requisite pre-suit ante litem notice of the
claim for damages pertaining to the death" of her daughter, it failed to
reference any claims on behalf of the daughter's estate or even identify
the plaintiff as the administratrix of the daughter's estate.17

7. Id.
8. 336 Ga. App. 555, 784 S.E.2d 894 (2016).
9. Id. at 559-60, 784 S.E.2d at 899.
10. Id. at 560, 784 S.E.2d at 899.
11. Id. at 556-58, 784 S.E.2d at 897-98.
12. Id. at 555-56, 784 S.E.2d at 896.
13. Id. at 560, 784 S.E.2d at 899.
14. Id.
15. O.C.G.A § 36-33-5(b) (2012).
16. Maia, 336 Ga. App. at 559, 784 S.E.2d at 899 (quoting City of Moultrie v. Price, 310
Ga. App. 672, 673, 713 S.E.2d 880, 881 (2011)).
17. Id.
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II. OPEN RECORDS ACT
In Smith v. Northside Hospital, Inc.,18 the Georgia Court of Appeals
considered whether a private nonprofit's records were subject to disclosure under the Open Records Act (ORA). 19 The Fulton County Hospital
Authority (FCHA), a public authority, created Northside Hospital, Inc.
(Northside), a private, nonprofit corporation, and executed a lease transferring all of its operating assets and existing operations to the nonprofit.
The nonprofit entered into transactions to acquire four privately owned
physician groups. An ORA request was submitted to Northside and to
FCHA for statements and documents relating to the acquisitions. The
FCHA responded that it had no such records. Northside asserted that as
a private, nonprofit hospital, it was not subject to the ORA. The requester
filed a complaint seeking an order compelling compliance with the ORA
and claiming that all of Northside's records are public records, because it
was created by the FCHA as a vehicle to act on the FCHA's behalf. 20
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the private nonprofit's records
were not automatically public documents simply because the nonprofit
was leasing from a public authority. 21 Instead, the requester would have
to show that the requested documents were prepared and maintained or
received by the nonprofit in the performance of a specific service or function on behalf of the FCHA.2 2 The court noted that "simply performing
some task or function that has an indirect public benefit, or which aids
the public as a whole, does not transform a private entity's records into
public records." 23 Given that the requester did not produce evidence that
the records sought were related to the business of the FCHA and therefore related to public business, the court held that the records sought
were not subject to the ORA.24
In Schick v. Board of Regents of the University Systems of Georgia,25
the Board of Regents (Regents) withheld certain documentation otherwise responsive to an ORA request, claiming that it was exempt from
disclosure under Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) section
50-18-72(a)(4), 26 because such records related to Regents' work in cooper-

18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

336 Ga. App. 843, 783 S.E.2d 480 (2016).
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-70 (2013).
Smith, 336 Ga. App. at 844-46, 783 S.E.2d at 481-82.
Id. at 843, 783 S.E.2d at 481.
Id. at 849, 783 S.E.2d at 485.
Id. at 856, 783 S.E.2d at 489.
Id. at 857, 783 S.E.2d at 490.
334 Ga. App. 425, 779 S.E.2d 452 (2015).
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) (2013).
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ation with a law enforcement agency during a pending criminal investigation. The requester claimed that Regents' failure to disclose was improper and that Regents' late submission of responsive documents entitled the requester to attorneys' fees. 27
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) exempts "[r]ecords of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity . .. ."28 Further, O.C.G.A. § 50-1872(a)(3) 29 exempts "records compiled for law enforcement or prosecution
purposes."3 0 Noting the distinction between these exemptions, the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that Regents was not a law enforcement
agency authorized to withhold .documents under O.C.G.A. § 50-1872(a)(4), even though such documents related to Regents' work in cooperation with law enforcement in a criminal investigation. 3 ' The court of
appeals noted that the expansive reading of the relevant exemption in
the statute was "directly contrary" to the statutory directive that exemptions be narrowly construed in favor of disclosure.32
Evans v. Georgia Bureau of Investigation33 involves an ORA request
submitted to the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (GBI) and emphasizes
the deference the judiciary affords law enforcement agencies. After the
GBI withdrew two arrest warrants that had been pending against Evans,
Evans submitted an ORA request to the GBI for materials from its investigative file that pertained to him. The GBI refused to produce, citing an
exemption in the ORA for pending investigations.34
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4) exempts from disclosure "[r]ecords of law enforcement, prosecution, or regulatory agencies in any pending investigation or prosecution of criminal or unlawful activity .. . .."35 The trial court
found that the requester was not entitled to the documents because, although the warrants against Evans had been dismissed, warrants against
two other individuals-arrested as part of the same investigation and the
investigations of whom were maintained in the same file as the investigation into the requester-had not been dismissed and remained pending.36

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Schick, 334 Ga. at 428-29, 779 S.E.2d at 455-56.
O.C.G.A § 50-18-72(a)(4).
O.C.G.A § 50-18-72(a)(3) (2013).
Id.
Schick, 334 Ga. at 432, 779 S.E.2d at 458.
Id.
297 Ga. 318, 773 S.E.2d 725 (2015).
Id. at 318, 773 S.E.2d at 726.
O.C.G.A. § 50-18-72(a)(4).
Evans, 297 Ga. at 319, 773 S.E.2d at 727.
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The Georgia Supreme Court distinguished between a "pending prosecution" and a "pending investigation," noting that a pending investigation can go on for much longer, until a decision is made on whether to
pursue prosecution. 37 The court also noted that the exemption for a pending law enforcement investigation does not apply to specific information
contained in law enforcement and prosecution records. 38 Instead, the
"subsection .

.

. exempts from disclosure the entirety of such records to

the extent that they are part of a 'pending investigation or prosecution'
and cannot be otherwise characterized as the initial arrest ... or incident
report."39 Here, where the requested records were part of a pending investigation, the entire record was exempt, not just those portions relating
to individuals still under investigation. 40
In Chua v. Johnson,41 a requester sought a copy of a record from the
District Attorney for the Brunswick Judicial Circuit. The record related
to the District Attorney's Office's criminal prosecution of the requester
and was a memorandum prepared by an attorney relating primarily to
prospective jurors' relationships to the then county sheriff. The District
Attorney's Office refused to provide the document, claiming that it was
attorney work product without citing the specific statutory subsection
upon which such exception to production was based. The requester
claimed that the failure to respond with an appropriate statutory citation
entitled the requester to the documents. 42
The court of appeals determined that the District Attorney's failure to
cite to the relevant exemption did not automatically entitle the requester
to the requested document. 43 Instead, an evidentiary hearing should have
been held to determine whether the document was subject to disclosure,
and the trial court erred in not holding such a hearing.4 4 This case raises
a viable question as to the actual enforceability of the requirement that
the statutory basis for withholding documents be identified with precision, as a mere hearing to determine applicability of an exemption has
always been a possible remedy, even when the statutory provision for
withholding documents had been provided.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 320, 773 S.E.2d at 727-28.
Id. at 320, 773 S.E.2d at 728.
Id.
Id. at 321, 773 S.E.2d at 728.
336 Ga. App. 298, 784 S.E.2d 449 (2016).
Id. at 298, 784 S.E.2d at 450.
Id.
Id.
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III. OPEN MEETINGS ACT
45

In Gravitt v. Olens, the Georgia Court of Appeals reviewed an individual's statutory right to videotape a public meeting and the validity of
immunity defenses asserted in relation to violations of such right. In this
case, a citizen attended a meeting of the City of Cumming City Council
and brought a video camera to videotape the meeting. 46 After the meeting
was convened, the City mayor announced that videotaping the meeting
was prohibited and directed the City's chief of police to remove the citizen's camera and tripod from the meeting area. Claiming that these actions by the City violated the Open Meetings Act, 47 the State of Georgia
brought an action against the City of Cumming and the City's mayor individually. 48
The Open Meetings Act (OMA) provides that "[v]isual and sound recordings during open meetings shall be permitted." 49 In Gravitt, the City
of Cumming claimed that sovereign and official immunity barred the
State's action to enforce the OMA.50 The Georgia Court of Appeals em-

phasized that the challenged actions in this case were taken in the course
of conducting a city council meeting, which constituted a quintessential
governmental function; therefore, the City would ordinarily be entitled
to assert the bar of sovereign immunity. However, "because the City derives its sovereign immunity from the State, the City had no immunity
that it could assert to bar an [OMA] enforcement action brought by the
State."5 1 Further, because the mayor was required by statutory directive
to allow visual and sound recordings during open meetings, the mayor's
actions were ministerial, and he was not entitled to official immunity.

52

IV. EMPLOYMENT

In Fulton County v. Andrews,5 3 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that
the terms of employment set forth in an "offer letter" do not supersede
county personnel regulations. In Andrews, current and former public defenders filed suit against the County, alleging breach of contract and violation of County laws and asserting that they were entitled to the same
45. 333 Ga. App. 484, 774 S.E.2d 263 (2015).
46. For purposes of full disclosure, your Author would note that his deposition was
taken in a lawsuit related to this fact pattern.
47. O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1 (2013).
48. Gravitt, 333 Ga. App. at 484-85, 774 S.E.2d at 266.
49. O.C.G.A. § 50-14-1(c).
50. Gravitt, 333 Ga. App. at 485, 774 S.E.2d at 266.
51. Id. at 487, 774 S.E.2d at 268.
52. Id. at 491, 774 S.E.2d at 270.
53. 332 Ga. App. 473, 773 S.E.2d 432 (2015).
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compensation given to county attorneys. 54 Pursuant to the Fulton County
Civil Service Merit System,5 5 the County developed a comprehensive set
of "Personnel Regulations," which includes a "Position Classification
Plan" providing that public defenders and county attorneys shall be
within the same job classification and the same pay grade.56 As part of
the compensation structure adopted by the County, "market premium"
pay raises are permissible in certain circumstances.5 7 The County applied premium pay raises for the county attorneys at a higher percentage
than for public defenders, thereby creating a pay disparity and, ultimately, the creation of a new pay range that perpetuated the pay dispar-

ity.5 8

The public defenders asserted that, pursuant to personnel regulations
established under the civil service system, they are entitled to the same
compensation given to the county attorneys. 5 They argued that the personnel regulations form an employment contract between the County and
the public defenders, and the County was prohibited from paying any
employee outside of the established pay ranges without a new countywide classification study.60 The court held that, just as a statute establishing a retirement plan for government employees become a part of the
employment contract, a statute establishing a merit-based compensation
structure similarly creates a contract between the merit system members
and the County. 6 1 As such, the County lacked authority to override the
personnel regulations established under the civil service system by creating separate terms in an offer letter. 62
V. IMMUNITY
A. Sovereign Immunity
In Olvera v. University System of Georgia's Board of Regents, 63 the
Georgia Supreme Court continued its recent examination of the extent to
which sovereign immunity bars claims against the state. Olvera involved

54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 473, 773 S.E.2d at 433.
Ga. H.R. Bill 1501 § 1, Reg. Sess., 1982 Ga. Laws 4896.
Andrews, 332 Ga. App. at 474-75, 773 S.E.2d at 434.
Id. at 475, 773 S.E.2d at 435.
Id.
Id. at 473, 773 S.E.2d at 433-34.
Id. at 476, 773 S.E.2d at 435.
Id. at 477, 773 S.E.2d at 436.
Id.
298 Ga. 425, 782 S.E.2d 436 (2016).
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a challenge to a Board of Regents policy requiring an applicant to demonstrate "lawful presence" in the United States in order to receive in-state
tuition. 64 A group of non-citizen students who were beneficiaries of deferred immigration action by the federal government sought a declaratory judgment that their deferred-action status meant that they were
65
lawfully present in the country and, thus, entitled to in-state tuition.
Agreeing with both the trial court and the court of appeals, the supreme
court held that sovereign immunity barred the declaratory judgment
67
claims. 6 6 Building on its 2014 holding in Center for a SustainableCoast,
the court held that the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity found in
the state Administrative Procedures Act (APA) was inapplicable to this
case.6 8 While the APA allows suits for declaratory judgment challenging
the validity of a state agency rule, the Board of Regents had not promulgated a rule related to the availability of in-state tuition to individuals
such as the plaintiffs; rather, the Board of Regents had simply interpreted an internal policy manual.6 9 Because the APA did not apply in this
context, and because no other statutory waiver of sovereign immunity
was identified by the plaintiffs, the lawsuit was properly dismissed.70
The supreme court used a similar analysis in holding that sovereign
immunity bars conventional quiet title claims against the state. In
TDGA, LLC v. CBIRA, LLC, 7 1 the purchaser of a property at a tax sale
filed a conventional quiet-title action under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40.72 The
Georgia Department of Revenue and the Georgia Department of Labor,
each of which had recorded tax liens against the property, were named
as parties. 73 In affirming the trial court's grant of the State's motion to
dismiss, the supreme court held that the conventional quiet title statutes
do not contain an express waiver of the State's sovereign immunity, and
74
therefore, the Departments were not subject to suit in that context. The
court went on to state that a quiet title action under O.C.G.A. § 23-3-6076

64. Id. at 425, 782 S.E.2d at 437.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 427, 782 S.E.2d at 438.
67. Ga. Dep't of Nat. Resources v. Ctr. for a Sustainable Coast, 294 Ga. 593, 755 S.E.2d
184 (2014) (holding that injunctive claims are generally barred by sovereign immunity).
68. Olvera, 298 Ga. at 427-28, 782 S.E.2d at 438.
69. Id. at 427, 782 S.E.2d at 438.
70. Id. at 428, 782 S.E.2d at 438.
71. 298 Ga. 510, 783 S.E.2d 107 (2016).
72. Id. at 510-11, 783 S.E.2d at 107-08; O.C.G.A. § 23-3-40 (2012).
73. TDGA, 298 Ga. at 510-11, 783 S.E.2d at 107-08.
74. Id. at 511-12, 783 S.E.2d at 108.
75. O.C.G.A. § 23-3-60 (2012).
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would not be barred by sovereign immunity because those statutes involve in rem claims- actions against the property rather than against the
State.76

Overturning a collection of court of appeals decisions, the supreme
court, in Rivera v. Washington,77 held that a trial court's denial of a motion asserting a sovereign immunity defense is not directly appealable
under the collateral order doctrine. In the underlying consolidated cases,
the trial courts denied motions to dismiss on sovereign immunity
grounds. Relying on a series of court of appeals decisions beginning with
Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia v. Canas,7 8 the defendants filed direct, rather than interlocutory, appeals from the trial
court rulings.7 9 The supreme court traced the history of the judicially created collateral order doctrine, which:
[R]ecognizes that a very small class of interlocutory rulings are effectively final in that they finally determine claims of right separable
from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to
be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that
appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.80
While generally affirming the validity of the collateral order rule, the
supreme court determined that the court in Canas had misapplied precedent by relying on an earlier case dealing with federal qualified immunity rather than state-law immunities.81 The supreme court then held that
the collateral order rule is not applicable in the context of motions denying immunity defenses, and thus, only the interlocutory appeal procedure
is available for such non-final immunity rulings. 82 Interestingly, the
court did suggest that trial courts allow interlocutory review as "the best
policy for trial courts to pursue when faced with a case that raises some
defense of immunity; courts should address motions on immunity issues
as early as practicable and, if there is any substantial question, permit
an interlocutory appeal to proceed." 83

76. TDGA, 298 Ga. at 512, 783 S.E.2d at 108-09.
77. 298 Ga. 770, 784 S.E.2d 775 (2016).
78. 295 Ga. App. 505, 672 S.E.2d 471 (2009).
79. Rivera, 298 Ga. at 771-71, 784 S.E.2d at 776-77.
80. Id. at 774, 784 S.E.2d at 778 (quoting State v. Cash, 298 Ga. 90, 92-93, 779 S.E.2d
603, 605-06 (2015)).
81. Id. at 775, 784 S.E.2d at 779.
82. Id. at 776-77, 784 S.E.2d at 779-80.
83. Id. at 777, 784 S.E.2d at 780.
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In Georgia Department of Labor v. RTT Associates, Inc.,84 the court
delved into the applicability of sovereign immunity in the context of contracts. A contractor sued the Georgia Department of Labor regarding
work performed in the development of software. The parties' written contract called for completion by June 30, 2012 and also required any
amendments to be in writing and executed by both parties. The Georgia
Department of Labor prepared internal requests for additional work, one
of which was created after the stated completion date in the contract;
however, those requests were not executed by the contractor. The contractor sued for breach and sought to recover for work performed after
the contract completion date.85 Reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court pointed out that the constitution provides that sovereign immunity is waived as to claims under written contracts.8 6 While private
parties may, by course of conduct, waive contractual provisions, the constitutional waiver of state sovereign immunity for written contracts is to
be strictly construed; as such, the parties' conduct-not supported by an
executed, written contract amendment-did not come within the constitutional waiver.87
In Rowland,8 8 the court of appeals considered the applicability of sovereign immunity to the plaintiffs' claims for inverse condemnation, nuisance, and similar claims following the City's construction of a drainage
ditch across the plaintiffs' properties. While recognizing that municipal
sovereign immunity arises from a separate constitutional provision than
that applicable to the state and counties, the court held that the principles set forth in the supreme court's 2014 Sustainable Coast decision
were equally applicable.89 In Sustainable Coast, the supreme court stated
that inverse condemnation claims arise from the takings clause, and because that clause requires compensation for takings, sovereign immunity
does not apply to such compensation claims.9 0 For the same reason, the
City's motion to dismiss in this case on sovereign immunity grounds was
properly denied by the trial court.91

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

299 Ga. 78, 786 S.E.2d 840 (2016).
Id. at 78-80, 786 S.E.2d at 841-42.
Id. at 80-81, 786 S.E.2d at 843.
Id. at 83, 786 S.E.2d at 844.
334 Ga. App. 148, 778 S.E.2d 409 (2015).
Id. at 150, 778 S.E.2d at 412.
Sustainable Coast, 294 Ga. at 600, 755 S.E.2d at 190.
Rowland, 334 Ga. App. at 150, 778 S.E.2d at 412.
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B. Official Immunity
Tattnall County v. Armstrong92 serves as a useful transition point between sovereign immunity and official immunity, as the court of appeals
endeavored to correct a line of cases that had long conflated critical distinctions between the two doctrines. In Armstrong, an inmate filed a lawsuit claiming that he had received improper medical care in the county
jail. 9 3 The official-capacity defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the

basis of sovereign immunity, but the trial court denied their motions, citing Cantrell v. Thurman94 for the proposition that the sovereign immunity does not apply to the provision of medical care to inmates on grounds
that the defendants had a ministerial duty to provide such care. However, the court of appeals held that Cantrell had "improperly conflated"
the analysis that applies to official immunity with the analysis applicable
to sovereign immunity. 95 Moreover, even though the proper analysis in
official-capacity claims is related to sovereign immunity, they are in fact
claims against the county itself, thus making the distinction between
ministerial and discretionary duties irrelevant.9 6 In view of the foregoing,
the court overruled Cantrell, disapproved of Middlebrooks v. Bibb
County,97 and reversed the trial court.9 8 Additionally, Judge Barnes' special concurrence is noteworthy for its suggestion that Georgia courts replace the term "official immunity" with the term "qualified immunity" to
avoid the confusion that results from the overlapping use of the term "official" in both sovereign and official immunity analysis.99 Several cases
have followed this suggestion,1 00 though it will be important going forward to avoid conflating the state law doctrine of qualified immunity
with the substantially different federal law doctrine.
The courts issued a number of opinions during the survey period grappling with whether certain statutes imposed ministerial or discretionary
duties upon the various government officials tasked with implementing
those laws. For instance, in Gravitt, the state attorney general brought a

92. 333 Ga. App. 46, 775 S.E.2d 573 (2015), overruled on other grounds by Rivera v.
Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 784 S.E.2d 775 (2016).
93. Id. at 46, 782 S.E.2d at 574.
94. 231 Ga. App. 510, 499 S.E.2d 416 (1998), overruled by Tattnall Cty. v. Armstrong,
333 Ga. App. 46, 775 S.E.2d 573 (2015).
95. Armstrong, 333 Ga. App. at 50, 775 S.E.2d at 576-77.
96. Id. at 50, 775 S.E.2d at 577.
97. 261 Ga. App. 382, 582 S.E.2d 539 (2003), abrogated by Tatnall Cty. v. Armstrong,
333 Ga. App. 46, 775 S.E.2d 573 (2015).
98. Armstrong, 333 Ga. App. at 47, 775 S.E.2d at 575.
99. Id. at 52-53, 775 S.E.2d at 578.
100. See, e.g., Hill v. Jackson, 336 Ga. App. 679, 683 n.3, 783 S.E.2d 719, 725 n.3 (2016).
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civil action against a mayor to enforce the OVIA, alleging that the mayor
had negligently violated the OVIA by refusing to allow a citizen to attend
and videotape a council meeting. The mayor raised official immunity by
motion to dismiss, but the trial court denied the motion and later granted
summary judgment to the attorney general. 101 On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court, holding that the mayor had breached ministerial
duties imposed by the OIA.102 Central to this holding was O.C.G.A. § 5014-1(c), which requires the public, at all times, to be "afforded access to
meetings declared open to the public pursuant [to the OIA, and] [v]isual
and sound recording during open meetings shall be permitted."10 3 Thus,
the court concluded that the OIA imposed ministerial duties because
the statutorily mandated actions are 'so clear, definite and certain as
merely to require the execution of a relatively simple, specific duty' in
104
accordance with the OIA."

In Crosby v. Johnson,1os on the other hand, the court held that certain
statutory duties imposed upon coroners were discretionary. There, the
administrator of a decedent's estate brought claims against the county
coroner, arguing that O.C.G.A. § 45-16-31106 created ministerial duties
with respect to the transport of deceased bodies. 107 The trial court agreed
and ruled that the coroner was not entitled to official immunity. On appeal, the court reversed and held that the coroner's actions were discretionary despite the requirements of the statute. 10 In so holding, the court
emphasized the permissive language found in O.C.G.A. § 45-16-31-language that authorized several courses of action rather than creating a
mandatory course of conduct.10 9 For example, the statute requires the
coroner to determine whether a location is inconvenient and whether the
morgue is "reasonably available," necessitating the exercise of discretion.110 Accordingly, the trial court erred in ruling that the statutory duties imposed upon the coroner were ministerial rather than discretionary."1

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Gravitt, 333 Ga. App. at 484, 774 S.E.2d at 266.
Id. at 485, 774 S.E.2d at 266.
Id. at 490-91, 774 S.E.2d at 270.
Id. at 491, 774 S.E.2d at 270.
334 Ga. App. 417, 779 S.E.2d 446 (2015).
O.C.G.A § 45-16-31 (2012).
Crosby, 334 Ga. App. at 418, 779 S.E.2d at 448.
Id. at 423, 779 S.E.2d at 451.
Id. at 422, 779 S.E.2d at 451.
Id. at 422-23, 779 S.E.2d at 451.
Id.
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In Eshleman v. Key, 112 the Georgia Supreme Court again held that a
statute and an ordinance imposed discretionary, rather than ministerial,
duties. The plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that a county police officer
had negligently allowed a police dog to escape from its kennel and attack
the plaintiffs child. The record contained no evidence that the County
gave specific direction to the police officer regarding off-duty restraint of
the dog. However, the plaintiff argued that O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7113 and a
related county ordinance imposed a duty upon the police officer to keep
the dog under restraint, and both the trial court and the court of appeals
agreed. 114 The supreme court reversed, however, holding that the officer's
duty to restrain the police dog was discretionary rather than ministerial,
thus entitling her to official immunity. 115 In so doing, the court acknowledged that O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 imposes a duty of care on keepers of dangerous dogs. 116 However, the court noted that the "important question in
the context of official immunity is not merely whether an officer owed a
duty of care, but rather, whether the official owed a duty that is particularized and certain enough to render her duty a ministerial one." 117 Here,
the court reasoned, ordinary care in determining how to reasonably keep
a dog restrained requires personal deliberation and judgment. 118
In Boatright v. Copeland,119 the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a
statutory prohibition on weapons in schools imposed a ministerial duty
on a school district. There, the plaintiff injured his hand while assisting
in loading and firing a cannon owned by the school district. He brought a
personal injury action against the district's superintendent and members
of the school board, arguing that bringing the cannon to the football game
violated O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127. 1(b)(1),120 which makes it "unlawful for any
person to carry to or to possess or have under such person's control while
within a school safety zone, [or] at a school function .

.

. any weapon or

explosive compound. . . ."121 The trial court ruled that each of the defendants were entitled to official immunity. On appeal, however, the court
held that the defendants had a ministerial duty to comply with O.C.G.A.
§ 16-11-127.1(b)(1) by not bringing any weapons or explosive compounds

112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

297 Ga. 364, 774 S.E.2d 96 (2015).
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-7 (2012).
Eshleman, 297 Ga. at 365, 774 S.E.2d at 98.
Id. at 370, 774 S.E.2d at 101-02.
Id. at 370, 774 S.E.2d at 101.
Id. at 367, 774 S.E.2d at 100.
Id. at 369, 774 S.E.2d at 101.
336 Ga. App. 107, 783 S.E.2d 695 (2016).
O.C.G.A. § 16-11-127.1(b)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2016).
Id.
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onto school grounds, and therefore, the trial court had erred in granting
the defendants' motion to dismiss.1 22

A number of additional cases wrestled with the application of official
immunity in the context of injuries to students. For example, in Tuggle
v. Rose,1 23 a student and his parents brought an assault and battery action against a teacher, alleging that the teacher had acted with actual
malice and intent to harm the student during an incident in which the
teacher held the student in a headlock and dragged him around the classroom. The trial court ruled that such evidence was sufficient to defeat the
teacher's motion for summary judgment on the basis of official immunity.
However, the court of appeals held that such evidence was "ambiguous"
and "circumstantial," and therefore, was insufficient to contradict the
teacher's direct testimony that she had not acted with malice or intent to
deliberately harm the student. 124 Thus, although the teacher's actions
may have demonstrated "frustration, irritation, and possibly even anger,"she was nonetheless entitled to summary judgment on the basis of
official immunity.1 25
In Davis v. Brantley County School District,126 a student's parent sued
a school district and a number of teachers for injuries the student sustained during a game of tug-of-war at a school event. The trial court
granted summary judgment to all of the teachers on the basis of official
immunity. However, the court of appeals emphasized that Davis, one of
the teachers, was involved in the event "as a parent," as: (1) he was
merely "helping out" with the tug-of-war game because his son was a participant; and (2) although he was employed by the school district as a
teacher at a different school, he was not on the clock at the time of the
incident.1 27 In response, the teacher argued that O.C.G.A. § 51-130.3(a)(1)128 granted him immunity as a parent assisting with school
functions, but the court declined to consider this argument because it had
not been raised to the trial court.1 29 As a result, the suit was allowed to
proceed against a defendant who seemingly should have been entitled to
official immunity, parental immunity, or both. It appears, however, that

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Boatright, 336 Ga. App. at 112, 783 S.E.2d at 700.
333 Ga. App. 431, 773 S.E.2d 485 (2015).
Id. at 436, 773 S.E.2d at 489.
Id. (quoting Tittle v. Corso, 256 Ga. App. 859, 862, 569 S.E.2d 873, 877 (2002)).
334 Ga. App. 684, 780 S.E.2d 60 (2015).
Id. at 688, 780 S.E.2d at 63.
O.C.G.A. § 51-1-30.3(a)(1) (2000).
Davis, 334 Ga. App. at 688-89, 780 S.E.2d at 63-64.
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neither the parties nor the court considered whether the teacher's parental immunity deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction and
thus could be raised for the first time on appeal. 130
In Vidal v. Leavell, 131 the court reached a different conclusion as to
whether an off-duty police officer was entitled to official immunity.
There, a patron brought an action against the restaurant and an off-duty
police officer hired by the restaurant to provide security, alleging that the
officer used excessive force when arresting the patron. However, whereas
in Davis, the court held that an off-duty teacher was not entitled to official immunity while helping out with an event at another school, in Vidal
the court applied the doctrine of official immunity to protect the off-duty
police officer.1 32 Davis and Vidal do not reference one another, but the
difference in result could perhaps be explained by cases such as Duncan
v. State,133 which hold that police officers have a broad, generalized duty
to enforce the law at all times.
Finally, it is worth contrasting the evidence that was deemed insufficient to create a jury issue as to actual malice in Tuggle with the evidence
that was considered sufficient to create a jury issue in Qenkor Construction, Inc. v. Everett.134 In Everett, a construction company brought suit
against the county sheriff alleging that the sheriffs conduct in executing
35
a search warrant resulted in the malicious conversion of property.1 In
reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the sheriff on
the conversion claim, the court of appeals listed several categories of evidence from which the jury could infer actual malice sufficient to pierce
official immunity: (1) the search warrant did not authorize the seizure of
the funds; (2) the sheriff seized the funds despite being warned by an
investigator that the warrant did not authorize it; (3) the sheriff misled
the plaintiff as to where the money was being kept; (4) the sheriff initially
refused to return the money, even after being directed to do so by the
District Attorney's Office; and (5) there was some evidence that the sheriff may have had some personal animosity toward the plaintiff.1 36 Thus,
whereas ambiguous anger and annoyance were insufficient to demonstrate actual malice in Tuggle, evidence of personal animosity, deception,

130. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. §§ 9-11-12(b)(1), (h)(3); Dep't of Transp. v. Kovalcik, 328 Ga. App.
185, 761 S.E.2d 584 (2014).
131. 333 Ga. App. 159, 775 S.E.2d 633 (2015), overruled on other grounds by Rivera v.
Washington, 298 Ga. 770, 784 S.E.2d 775 (2016).
132. Id. at 164, 775 S.E.2d at 637.
133. 163 Ga. App. 148, 294 S.E.2d 365 (1982).
134. 333 Ga. App. 510, 773 S.E.2d 821 (2015).
135. Id. at 510, 773 S.E.2d at 823.
136. Id. at 522-23, 773 S.E.2d at 830-31.
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and repeated overstepping of authority were sufficient to create a jury
issue as to actual malice in Everett.
VI. TAX
The Survey period included a wide range of ad valorem tax issues, including: the enforceability of consent agreements to tax appeals, the definition of an "arm's length, bona fide sale," charitable tax exemptions,
and sovereign immunity. Because property values are recalculated by the
boards of assessors each year, the parties to an ad valorem tax appeal
will often request that any consent order specifically include a stipulation
that O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c)1 37 shall apply. Property values established
pursuant to that section may not be increased by the board of assessors
during the next two years "for the sole purpose of changing the valuation
established."13 8 There are exceptions, of course, but this provision provides at least a modicum of finality.
In Surette v. Henry County Board of Tax Assessors,139 a taxpayer
agreed to a consent order establishing the property value for tax years
2011 through 2013, "subject to the provision of O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c)."1 40
In 2013, the taxpayer nevertheless appealed again.141 The question was
whether the taxpayer's filing of a tax appeal triggered the exception to
O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c), which provides that the board of assessors may
increase the established value if the taxpayer files a tax return.142 The
trial court granted the board of assessors' motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the consent order was conclusive as to the value for 2013.143
The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting the taxpayer's argument that the filing of a tax appeal was the functional equivalent of filing
a property return, noting that the taxpayer's notice of appeal was not
filed prior to the April 1 deadline for tax returns and did not contain the
declaration under oath required of tax returns.1 44 There is an inherent
friction between O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306(a),1 45 which requires local boards of

137. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-299(c) (2010).
138. Id.
139. 332 Ga. App. 457, 773 S.E.2d 416 (2015).

140. Id. at 458, 773 S.E.2d at 417.
141. Id.

142. Id. at 459-60, 773 S.E.2d at 418.
143. Id. at 458, 773 S.E.2d at 417.

144. Id. at 460, 773 S.E.2d at 418.
145. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-306(a) ("The board [of assessors] shall see that all taxable property
within the county is assessed and returned at its fair market value and that fair market
values as between the individual taxpayers are fairly and justly equalized so that each
taxpayer shall pay as nearly as possible only such taxpayer's proportionate share of taxes.").

2016]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

215

assessors to assess property at its fair market value, and O.C.G.A. §§ 485-2 (.1) and (3),146 which requires the boards of assessors to assess property purchased via "distress sale, short sale, bank sale, or sale at public
auction"1 47 at the sales price in the year following the sale.148 The question ultimately turns on whether the transaction was an "arm's length,
1 49
bona fide transaction."
In two related cases, Ballard v. Newton County Board of Tax Asses-

sors 50 and Park Solutions, LLC v. DeKalb County Board of Tax Assessors,15 1 the court of appeals held that, while a tax sale is not an arm's

length transaction, bona fide sale, a judicial sale is conducted at arm's
length.1 52 In Ballard, the subject property was purchased in the prior

year at a tax sale, but the board of assessors determined that the sale did
not reflect the fair market value of the property and assessed the property at what it determined the fair market value would have been in a

non-distressed sale. 5 3 By definition, an "arm's length, bona fide sale" is
a "transaction which has occurred in good faith without fraud or deceit
carried out by unrelated or unaffiliated'parties, as by a willing buyer and
a willing seller, each acting in his or her own self-interest, including ...
sale at public auction."15 4 Although a tax sale is a "sale at public auction,"

146. Compare also O.C.G.A. §§ 48-5-2(.1) and (3) with O.C.G.A. § 48-5-1 C'The intent and
purpose of the tax laws of this state are to have all property and subjects of taxation returned at the value which would be realized from the cash sale, but not the forced sale, of
the property and subjects as such property and subjects are usually sold except as otherwise
provided in this chapter.").
147. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(.1) (2010).
148. DeKalb Cty. Bd. of Tax Assessors v. W. C. Harris & Co., 248 Ga. 277, 280-81, 282
S.E.2d 880, 884 (1981) ("The fair market value of land . . is a question which necessarily
addresses itself to the honesty, the experience, and the familiarity [ofj land values in a
given locality of the person or persons whose duty it becomes to determine and fix it.").
149. See, e.g., CPF Invs., LLLP v. Fulton Cnty. Bd. of Assessors, 330 Ga. App. 744, 745,
769 S.E.2d 159, 160 (2015) (where the Fulton County Board of Assessors unsuccessfully
argued that the sale of property at a substantial loss by Freddie Mac did not constitute an
"arm's length, bona fide sale" because public entities act in the public interest rather than
in their own self-interest).
150. 332 Ga. App. 521, 773 S.E.2d 780 (2015).
151. 336 Ga. App. 832, 783 S.E.2d 453 (2016).
152. Pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(.1) and (3), any person who acquires property in an
"arm's length, bona fide sale" is entitled to have such property assessed for tax purposes at
the purchase price for the year following the sale. Id.
153. Ballard, 332 Ga. App. at 521, 773 S.E.2d at 781.
154. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(.1) (2010). See also O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) (2010) (defining fair market value as "the amount a knowledgeable buyer would pay for the property and a willing
seller would accept for the property at an arm's length, bona fide sale").
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the court noted that it lacked the "willing seller" component. 155 Ultimately, however, the court concluded that tax sales are fundamentally
distinguishable from all other types of distressed sales because a tax sale
purchaser only receives a defeasible fee interest, as opposed to fee simple
title, on account of the twelve month statutory right of redemption. 156
In Park Solutions, the trial court held that a judicial foreclosure sale
was not an arm's length, bona fide sale, relying upon O.C.G.A. § 48-51,15 7which states that "[t]he intent and purpose of the tax laws of this
state are to have all property .

.

. returned at the value which would be

realized from the cash sale, but not the forced sale, of the property." 58
The court of appeals reversed, holding that O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(.1) specifically includes public auctions within the definition of a bona fide sale. 159
The court noted that O.C.G.A. § 48-5-2(3) "expressly provides that it applies '[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this chapter to the contrary[.]"' 60 Therefore, notwithstanding O.C.G.A. § 48-5-1, the court concluded that taxpayers purchasing property at a judicial sale are entitled
to have, for the year following the sale, the assessed value of such property fixed at the purchase price.161
In Columbus Board of Tax Assessors v. Medical Center Hospital Authority,162 the court of appeals affirmed summary judgment, holding that
a local hospital authority's tax exemption extended to a large unimproved
wooded parcel and a hospital building that rented a small amount of
space to a for-profit clinic. The court affirmed the general rule that hospital authority-owned property is a tax exempt "public property," even
where such property itself was not a part of the hospital, so long as its
income was "properly devoted to public purposes .

.

. in the furtherance

of the legitimate functions of the hospital authority."163 The court held

155. Ballard, 332 Ga. App. at 524-25, 773 S.E.2d at 783.
156. Id.
157. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-1 (2010).
158. Park Solutions, 336 Ga. App. at 834, 783 S.E.2d at 454 (emphasis in original).
159. Id. at 836, 783 S.E.2d at 456.
160. Id. at 834, 783 S.E.2d at 455.
161. Id. at 836, 783 S.E.2d at 455. While not discussed in either Ballardor Park Solutions, it is worth noting that although judicial in rem tax sales are conducted in the same
manner as all other judicial sales, the original owners are entitled to a sixty day redemption
period pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 48-4-81(c) and, presumably, would be governed under the
rule in Ballardrather than ParkSolutions.
162. 336 Ga. App. 746, 783 S.E.2d 182 (2016).
163. Id. at 750, 783 S.E.2d at 185. See also Hosp. Auth. of Albany v. Stewart, 226 Ga.
530, 175 S.E.2d 857, (1970). The statutory basis for the hospital authority's exemption is
provided by O.C.G.A. § 31-7-72(e)(1) in conjunction with O.C.G.A. § 48-5-41(a)(1)(A).
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that the large wooded lot with walking trails was tax exempt public property because it was made available to the staff and patients free of
charge. 164 The parcel that contained both a non-profit hospital and a forprofit clinic was also tax exempt because the income derived from the
lease of the clinic was devoted to the hospital authority's legitimate functions and no more than 50% of the floor space was leased to a for-profit
entity. 165
Finally, consistent with another recent opinion affirming the applicability of sovereign immunity to claims for damages against county tax
commissioners, 166 the court of appeals held in Raw Properties, Inc. v.
Lawson167 that sovereign immunity was an absolute bar to claims for
damages against county tax commissioners for the failure to properly
mail mandatory tax sale notices to a property owner, in this case one who
then had to pay $26,000 in expenses, including a statutory premium, to
16
Because tax commissioners are
redeem the property following the sale.e
entitled to sovereign immunity in their official capacities to the full extent afforded to the state and its departments,16 9 absent an express and
specific waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the statutory notice
requirements, which the taxpayer here was unable to demonstrate, the
tax commissioner was entitled to sovereign immunity. 170
VII. CONTRACTS
A. IntergovernmentalAgreements
In Savage v. State,171 the Georgia Supreme Court heard a challenge to
the new Atlanta Braves stadium in Cobb County. In 2014, the Atlanta
Braves, Cobb County, and the Cobb-Marietta Coliseum and Exhibit Hall
Authority (the Authority) agreed to develop the stadium site, and the Authority initiated a $397 million revenue bond offering. Repayment of the
bond debt would be funded in part by the Braves' thirty-year lease of the
stadium, and in part by an intergovernmental agreement (the IGA) between the Authority and Cobb County, where Cobb County agreed to pay
the principal and interest on the bonds in exchange for ownership of the

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
Barrow
170.
171.

Med. Ctr. Hosp. Auth., 336 Ga. App. at 752, 783 S.E.2d at 187.
Id. at 7.52-53, 783 S.E.2d at 187. See also O.C.G.A. § 31-7-72(e)(2).
See Bartow Cty. v. S. Dev., III, L.P., 325 Ga. App. 879, 756 S.E.2d 11 (2014).
335 Ga. App. 802, 783 S.E.2d 161 (2016).
Id. at 802, 783 S.E.2d at 162.
Id. See also Gilbert v. Richardson, 264 Ga. 744, 452 S.E.2d 476 (1994); Layer v.
Cty., 297 Ga. 871, 778 S.E.2d 156 (2015).
Lawson, 335 Ga. App. at 804-05, 783 S.E.2d at 163-64.
297 Ga. 627, 774 S.E.2d 624 (2015).
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stadium.1 72 After allowing the stadium's opponents to intervene in the
revenue bond validation hearing,1 7 3 the Cobb County Superior Court rejected their claims and validated the bonds.1 74 The opponents then appealed directly to the Georgia Supreme Court.
First, the opponents argued that the IGA was not a valid intergovernmental agreement under Article IX, Section III, Paragraph I(a) of the
Georgia Constitution,175 which requires IGAs to address "joint services . . . the provision of services, or . .. the joint or separate use of facilities or equipment." 7 6 The Georgia Supreme Court found the IGA valid
because it involved the mutual "provision of services."' 77 The court emphasized that the Georgia Constitution does not require "extensive" provision of services and noted that issuance of bonds would qualify as a
"service."17 8 Because the Authority would issue revenue bonds and acquire and license the underlying real property, while the County would
oversee the construction of the stadium, both parties were providing services under the IGA.17 9 The Georgia Constitution also requires that IGAs
"deal with activities, services, or facilities which the contracting parties
are authorized by law to undertake or provide."180 In Cobb County's case,
it was a close question whether the stadium fell within the County's constitutional authority to supply the public with "parks" and "recreational
facilities."' 8 ' The court concluded that the broad ordinary meaning of
"recreation" encompasses the viewing of professional athletics and found
that the project could be expected to benefit the public.1 82
Second, the stadium opponents argued that the bonds and IGA violated the debt limitation clause, Article IX, Section V, Paragraph I(a) of
the Georgia Constitution,183 wherein a political subdivision of the state
may not "incur any new debt without the assent of a majority of the qualified voters . . . voting in an election held for that purpose."1 84 According
to the supreme court, the Authority had not acquired any "debt" because
172. Id. at 627-29, 630, 774 S.E.2d at 627-29.
173. Georgia law requires revenue bonds to be formally validated in a superior court
proceeding. See O.C.G.A. § 36-82-73 (2015).
174. Savage, 297 Ga. at 631, 774 S.E.2d at 630.
175. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 3, para. 1(a).
176. Id.
177. Savage, 297 Ga. at 633-34, 774 S.E.2d at 631-32.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 3, para. 1(a).
181. Savage, 297 Ga. at 635, 774 S.E.2d at 632.
182. Id. at 635, 637, 774 S.E.2d at 632, 34.
183. GA. CONST. art. IX, § 5, para. 1(a).
184. Id.
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the revenue bonds were a limited obligation, to be repaid only out of revenue derived from the stadium. 185 Cobb County, in contrast, had indeed
acquired a substantial new debt when it agreed, under the IGA, to pay
interest and principal on the bonds.186 However, the court held that IGAs
are exempt from the requirements of the debt limitation clause.187 The
court acknowledged one early decision, DeJarnette v. Hospital Authority
of Albany,188 that enforced the debt limitation clause against an IGA, but
it concluded that DeJarnette'sprecedent was outweighed by contrary
holdings expressed in "multiple decisions, under each of the last three
Georgia Constitutions and in each of the last seven decades." 8 9 The court
also noted that adopting DeJarnette'srule would have harmful practical
effects, casting "into doubt countless existing contracts entered without
a referendum, as well as plans for future contracts, for a wide variety of
facilities and services."190
Third, the stadium opponents argued that the IGA violated the gratuities clause, Article III, Section VI, Paragraph VI(a)(1) of the Georgia
Constitution,191 wherein governments "shall not have the power to grant
any donation or gratuity or to forgive any debt or obligation owing to the
public."1 92 Swiftly dismissing this argument, the court observed that both
the Authority and the County received consideration under the IGA, and
declined to question the sufficiency of that consideration. 198
Fourth, the stadium opponents argued that the IGA violated the lending clause, Article IX, Section II, Paragraph VIII of the Georgia Constitution,1 94 which prohibits a county, "through taxation, contribution or
otherwise, to appropriate money for or lend its credit to any person or to
any nonpublic corporation or association except for purely charitable purposes."195 While the Braves undoubtedly would benefit from the stadium
project, the IGA did not violate the lending clause because it did not require the County to give property to the Braves.1 96 The court concluded
by cautioning the architects of future IGAs and revenue bond offerings
that, while "local governments, businesses, and individuals are entitled
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.

Savage, 297 Ga. at 639, 774 S.E.2d at
Id.
Id. at 639-40, 774 S.E.2d at 635.
195 Ga. 189, 23 S.E.2d 716 (1942).
Savage, 297 Ga. at 639, 774 S.E.2d at
Id. at 642, 774 S.E.2d at 637.
GA. CONST. art. III, § 6, para. 6(a)(1).
Id.
Savage, 297 Ga. at 643, 774 S.E.2d at
GA. CONST. art. IX, § 2, para. 8.
Id.
Savage, 297 Ga. at 643, 774 S.E.2d at

635.

635.

637.

637-38.
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to rely on our precedents, particularly in organizing their contractual and
financial affairs . . . . aspects of the deal structure at issue may push the
law about as far as it can go." 197
B. Requirement of a Written Contract
In Layer v. Barrow County,198 the Georgia Supreme Court reaffirmed
the importance of reducing local government contracts to writing. 199 The
plaintiff contractor had constructed a sewer pumping station for Barrow
County, allegedly in reliance on a county official's oral promise to reserve
a certain portion of sewer capacity for the contractor. Attempting to enforce this unwritten agreement, the plaintiff sued Barrow County, the
City of Auburn, and various County and city officials in their official and
personal capacities. 200 As a threshold matter, the court addressed the
sovereign immunity defense. 201 Recognizing that the Georgia Constitution waives sovereign immunity for "action [s] ex contractu for the breach
of any written contract," 202 the court held that immunity had .not been
waived because the claims were founded upon an unwritten contract. 203
C. Incorporationof Contract Terms by Reference
The Georgia Court of Appeals, in Shelnutt v. Mayor & Alderman of
Savannah,204 confirmed the importance of using clear language to incorporate supplemental terms or documents into a contract. In Shelnutt,
fifty City of Savannah firefighters sued for back pay, alleging that the
City had denied them pay increases mandated by the City's written Pay
Policy. 205 In its defense, the City cited language in its Employee Handbook, which stated that "any policy, procedure, or benefit outlined in this
handbook may be modified, decreased, eliminated or increased at any
time with or without advance notice . . . . the City remains free to decide
in all cases whether to apply the policies expressed herein to any particular set of circumstances." 206

197. Id. at 648, 774 S.E.2d at 641.
198. 297 Ga. 871, 778 S.E.2d 156 (2015).
199. The Georgia Supreme Court further explored the question of whether sovereign
immunity could be waived through oral extension of a written contract. See Ga. Dep't of
Labor v. RTT Assocs., Inc., 299 Ga. 78, 786 S.E.2d 840 (2016).
200. Layer, 297 Ga. at 871, 778 S.E.2d at 157.
201. Id. at 871, 778 S.E.2d at 158.
202. GA. CONST. art. I, § 2, para. 9(c) (emphasis added).
203. Layer, 297 Ga. at 871, 778 S.E.2d at 158.
204. 333 Ga. App. 446, 776 S.E.2d 650 (2015).
205. Id. at 447, 776 S.E.2d at 652-53.
206. Id. at 448, 776 S.E.2d at 653.
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The court of appeals rejected the City's defense, holding that the disclaimer in the Employee Handbook did not apply to the separate Pay Policy. 207 The court determined that the Employee Handbook did "not include or expressly incorporate the City's Pay Policy" but merely
"refer[red] the employee to the City's Pay Policy" for additional "specific
information." 208 While the trial court had accepted the "reference" to the
Pay Policy as a sufficient basis to apply the terms of the Employee Handbook to the Pay Policy, the court of appeals disagreed. 209 It held that,
because "the Handbook merely directed employees to refer to a digital
version of the Pay Policy on the City's hard drive for more information,"
and "neither document expressly incorporated the other," there was no
"basis .. . for treating the Handbook .. . as part of the Pay Policy." 210
VIII. MANDAMUS

In Clayton County Board of Commissioners v. Murphy,211 a former assistant director of a county's community-development department filed a
mandamus action, seeking to compel the County to offer him employment
following a determination that he had been terminated without sufficient
cause. The trial court granted the writ of mandamus. On appeal, however, the supreme court held that the plaintiff did not have a clear legal
right to employment in his former position sufficient to compel the
County to offer him the position, as: (1) the trial court only ordered the
County to offer reemployment pursuant to the civil service rules; and (2)
the civil service rules did not require the County to re-create an eliminated position, such as the one formerly held by the plaintiff. 212 Addition-

ally, although the plaintiff claimed he was "qualified" for numerous other
available jobs with the County, the record did not reflect any available
jobs that were "sufficiently similar" to his prior position so as to trigger
the civil service rules' requirement that he be offered a "similar" position,
and, therefore, the former assistant director did not have a clear legal
right to employment in some other County position. 213

207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id. at 449, 776 S.E.2d at 654.
Id. at 448, 776 S.E.2d at 653.
Id. at 449, 776 S.E.2d at 654.
Id.
297 Ga. 763, 778 S.E.2d 193 (2015).
Id. at 764-65, 778 S.E.2d at 195-96.
Id. at 765-66, 778 S.E.2d at 196.
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IX. ORDINANCE INTERPRETATION

In Burton v. Glynn County, 214 property owners brought an action
against the County, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, writs of
mandamus, and prohibition to stop the County's efforts to enforce its zoning ordinance so as to prohibit the use of the owners' property as an event
venue. 215 More specifically, the County argued that the frequency and
intensity of the property's use as a wedding venue rose to such a level
that it was no longer a permissible "accessory use" under the property's
zoning classification. 216 The trial court issued a declaratory judgment
that the owners were in violation of the ordinance, and the supreme court
affirmed. 217 While many prior cases have held zoning ordinances are to
be strictly construed against the government, 218 the supreme court in
Burton continued more recent jurisprudence 219 by applying normal rules
of construction to zoning ordinances, including the "cardinal rule" of giving meaning to the lawmakers' intent. 220 Using this analysis, the court
found that the intent of the particular zoning classification in question
was to provide for stable single-family dwellings and to avoid encroachment of higher-density uses that would adversely affect the single-family
character of the dwelling. 221 The court then concluded that the owners'
use of the property as a wedding venue did not qualify as an allowable
"accessory use," because a wedding venue was not incidental to use as a
single-family dwelling. 222
X. ZONING AND LAND USE

In Bulloch County Board of Commissioners v. Williams, 223 the Georgia
Court of Appeals overturned a superior court order reversing the Board
of Commissioners' denial of a conditional use permit and confirmed that
an appellate court's standard of review is whether there is "any evidence"
to support the decision of the local governing body, and not whether there

214. 297 Ga. 544, 776 S.E.2d 179 (2015).
215. Id. at 545, 776 S.E.2d at 181.
216. Id. at 546-48, 776 S.E.2d at 182-84.
217. Id.
218. See, e.g., Stanfield v. Glynn Cty., 280 Ga. 785, 631 S.E.2d 374 (2006); Haralson Cty.
v. Taylor Junkyard of Bremen, Inc., 291 Ga. 321, 729 S.E.2d 357 (2012).
219. See, e.g., Golden Isles Outdoor, LLC v. Lamar Co., LLC, 331 Ga. App. 494, 771
S.E.2d 173 (2015).
220. Burton, 297 Ga. at 546, 776 S.E.2d at 182.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 546, 776 S.E.2d at 182.
223. 332 Ga. App. 815, 773 S.E.2d 37 (2015).
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is any evidence to support the decision of the superior court. 224 The court
of appeals found that the information before the Board adequately supported its decision to deny the application for a conditional use permit.225
In Elbert County v. Sweet City Landfill, LLC,226 Elbert County appealed the trial court's decision granting Sweet City's demand for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the County regarding Sweet
City's application for a special use permit related to the construction and
operation of a solid waste disposal facility. The trial court granted summary judgment to Sweet City, finding that the County's Solid Waste Ordinance violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the United States
Constitution and that the Board had deprived Sweet City of equal protection under both the United States and Georgia Constitutions. 227 The
Georgia Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by failing to apply
the balancing test set forth in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. 228 to determine
if the County's solid waste ordinance (1) effectuates a legitimate, local
public interest, and (2) only incidentally effects interstate commerce. 229
The case was remanded back to the trial court to allow for consideration
of the Pike balancing test.
In Burton, the Georgia Supreme Court upheld Glynn County's enforcement of its zoning ordinance against homeowners who operated their
home on St. Simon's Island as an event venue, determining that the evidence presented was insufficient to support the homeowners' equal protection claim. 230 The County issued a cease and desist letter to the Burtons contending that the use of their property as a vacation rental
violated the local zoning ordinance. In response, the Burtons filed suit,
claiming that such enforcement violated their rights to due process and
equal protection. Following a hearing, the trial court found that the
County's interpretation of its zoning ordinance was proper and rejected
the Burtons' assertion that they were being unfairly treated compared to
other similar properties throughout the County. The trial court found
that the Burtons "presented no evidence of other residential properties
in Glynn County that . .. operated in the same manner as [theirs] but
were treated differently by the County." 23 1 Following a de novo review,
the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the County's ordinance was

224.
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226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

Id. at 815, 773 S.E.2d at 38.
Id. at 817, 773 S.E.2d at 40.
297 Ga. 429, 774 S.E.2d 658 (2015).
Id. at 431, 774 S.E.2d at 661.
397 U.S. 137 (1970).
Elbert Cty., 297 Ga. at 435-36, 774 S.E.2d at 664.
Burton, 297 Ga. at 544, 776 S.E.2d at 181.
Id. at 545, 776 S.E.2d at 181-82.
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sufficiently precise such that the Burtons' use of their residence as an

232
event venue did not qualify as a permissible use under the zoning code.

XI. CONDEMNATION

Department of Transportationv. MillS 233 serves as a cautionary tale to
condemning authorities who try to cut costs by acquiring a permanent
easement instead of fee simple title to property. In general, permanent
easements cost a fraction of fee simple because a property owner loses all
rights to use property conveyed in fee simple, whereas the owner retains
the right to use property subject to an easement in any manner that does
234
As part of its project to
not interfere with the easement-holder's right.
widen State Highway 20, the Georgia Department of Transportation
(GDOT) condemned a permanent slope easement on an undeveloped
property in Bartow County.2 35 Unfortunately for the owner, the necessary slope would reshape the property from a fairly modest grade to such
a steep grade that commercial development would be prohibitively expensive. 236 At trial, the owner argued that GDOT's appraiser greatly undervalued the property and failed to properly assess the loss in commer237
The jury
cial value resulting from the permanent slope easement.
found for the owner and awarded $1.5 million in total damages, representing $1.2 million above the amount GDOT had offered for the slope
easement. 238 Interest on the award brought the judgement to $1.72 million. 239 Although permanent easements have a legitimate place in road
construction and maintenance, this case suggests that condemning authorities should take care that appraisers properly assess the extent to
which a permanent easement will burden a property.
Further underscoring the need to carefully evaluate appraisals before
filing a condemnation action is Shiv Aban, Inc. v. GeorgiaDepartmentof

232. Id. at 549, 776 S.E.2d at 183.
233. Judgment, Dep't of Trans. v. Mills, 13-CV-1199 (Bartow Cty. Super. Ct. Feb. 3,
2016).
234. See Brown v. Tomlinson, 246 Ga. 513, 514, 272 S.E.2d 258, 259 (1980) ("An easement is the 'right in the owner of one parcel of land . . . to use the land of another for a
special purpose not inconsistent with a general property in the owner."' (quotation omitted)).
235. R. Robin McDonald, State to Pay Bartow County Landowner $1.7M for Highway
Slope Easement, Jury Says, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REP., Feb. 12, 2016, available at
http://www.dailyreportonline.com/id=1202749595428?keywords=robin+McDonald&public
ation=Daily+Report.
236. Id.
237. See id.
238. Id.
239. Id.

2016]

LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW

225

Transportation.240 This case is noteworthy because the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that a condemning authority must pay prejudgment interest on an award as determined by a board of assessors and not solely on
an award as determined by a jury. 241 Additionally, the court also affirmed
an award of attorney fees and litigation costs in favor of the property
owner as a sanction for GDOT's decision to file a condemnation in reliance on an outdated appraisal. 242
In Shiv Aban, Inc., GDOT's appraiser valued a property improved with
a motel at $430,000. Notably, the appraiser inspected the property
shortly after a tornado severely damaged the motel, which substantially
diminished the property value. GDOT did not file the condemnation until
approximately ten months after the appraiser's inspection, by which time
the owner repaired the damaged motel. Despite this, GDOT did not update the appraisal before filing the condemnation and paid $430,000 into
the court's registry as estimated just compensation. The owner appealed
and sought an interlocutory hearing before a board of assessors as to the
sufficiency of the compensation. GDOT's only evidence at the hearing
consisted of testimony from a new appraiser who valued the property at
$1.25 million as of the date of taking. The assessors determined that the
owner was entitled to $1.7 million, and both parties accepted this conclusion. Accordingly, the trial court entered an order approving the assessors' determination, and the owner dismissed its request for a jury trial.
However, the parties disputed whether the owner was entitled to prejudgment interest, costs, and fees. 243
GDOT argued that O.C.G.A.

§

32-3-19(c), 244 the prejudgment interest

provision, only applied to judgments following a jury trial rather than
determinations by a board of assessors because other subsections of that
statute only addressed cases heard by a jury.2 45 The court of appeals dis-

agreed, explaining that, for two main reasons, O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19(c) was
not limited to cases resolved by jury trial. 24 6 First, the court observed that
O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19(c) did not expressly limit itself to final judgments following a jury verdict, unlike other subsections of that statute. 247 Second,
the court observed that the statute that provides for a hearing before the
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242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.

336 Ga. App. 804, 784 S.E.2d 134 (2016).
Id. at 813, 784 S.E.2d at 143.
Id. at 820-21, 784 S.E.2d at 146.
Id. at 805, 815, 784 S.E.2d at 137, 143.
O.C.G.A. § 32-3-19(c) (2012).
Shiv Aban, Inc., 336 Ga. App. at 811, 784 S.E.2d at 141.
Id.
Id.
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248
assessors lacks a mechanism to transfer a case to the closed docket.
This meant that the assessors' determination required the additional
step of a court order to become a final judgment and permit transfer of
the case to the closed docket. It followed that prejudgment interest accrues on the assessors' award. 249
The case of Land USA, LLC v. Georgia Power Co.250 examined what
happens when property is condemned or otherwise acquired during the
redemption period of a tax sale. As part of a road widening project, Georgia Power Company (Georgia Power) had to relocate certain transmission
lines, and it sought an easement from a property owner for this purpose.
However, the owner was delinquent on his taxes, and his property was
sold at a tax sale to a new owner who recorded a tax deed. Although Georgia Power knew of the tax sale, it purchased the easement from the original owner in reliance on his representations that he would pay off the
taxes and redeem the property. Next, the tax deed owner served notices
of foreclosure and the right to redeem the property on interested parties,
including Georgia Power. No party redeemed the property, and the tax
deed owner conveyed its interest to Land USA, LLC (Land USA), which
then filed suit against Georgia Power to challenge the easement's validity
251
and eject Georgia Power from the property.
Land USA argued that Georgia Power's easement became a nullity
when the property was not redeemed within the one-year redemption pe-

riod. 252 The Georgia Supreme Court agreed, explaining that, although

the original owner had a right to possess the property during the redemption period, he lacked sufficient interest to grant Georgia Power an indefeasible property right, and Georgia Power acquired its easement subject
253
The supreme court reasoned that, because
to the prior tax deed.

O.C.G.A. § 44-9-7254 explicitly validates easements recorded prior to a tax
fi.fa., easements recorded after a tax fi.fa. or a tax deed would be extin255
Thus, when no party reguished if the property was not redeemed.
deemed the property during the redemption period, this extinguished
256
Georgia Power's easement interest.
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Id.
Id. at 812, 784 S.E.2d at 141.
297 Ga. 237, 773 S.E.2d 236 (2015).
Id. at 238, 773 S.E.2d at 238.
Id. at 239, 773 S.E.2d at 239.
Id. at 240, 773 S.E.2d at 239.
O.C.G.A. § 44-9-7 (2012).
Land USA, 297 Ga. at 241-42, 773 S.E.2d at 240.
Id. at 240, 773 S.E.2d at 240.
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XII. INVERSE CONDEMNATION/ STORM WATER

In Pribeagu v. Gwinnett County,257 the Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the elements of damage available to a plaintiff in a storm water
inverse condemnation action. 258 Prior to trial, the County asserted that
sovereign immunity barred the plaintiffs' claims for damage to personal
property, cost of repair, and attorney's fees. 259 After acknowledging that
sovereign immunity is waived for nuisances that amount to a taking of
property, 260 the court reiterated that damages recoverable in an inverse
condemnation action "are a substitute for the damages recoverable in a
condemnation proceeding and are measured by the same standard." 26 1
The court restated the standard for consequential damages as "the difference between the fair market value of the remaining property prior to
the taking and the fair market value of the remaining property after the
taking." 262

In response to the County's assertion that damage to personal property claimed by the plaintiff was not recoverable for an inverse condemnation claim, 263 the court of appeals recognized that, as used in the inverse condemnation context, "'the term 'property' is a very comprehensive
one, and is used not only to signify things real and personal[1y] owned,
but to designate the right of ownership and that which is subject to be
owned and enjoyed."' 264 With respect to evidence of "cost of repair," while
acknowledging that "where evidence of cost of repair '[plays] no part in
the appraiser's calculation of the fair market value' of the property, such
evidence does not support a claim of damages in a condemnation proceeding," 265 the court held that "such evidence is admissible to the extent that
it is offered as a factor in determining the amount of any diminution in
value to the Pribeagus' property .

.

. and not as a separate element of

257. 336 Ga. App. 753, 785 S.E.2d 567 (2016).
258. Id. at 753, 785 S.E.2d at 569. In Pribeagu, the plaintiff alleged that the County
failed to maintain the road and storm water drainage system serving the Pribeagus' residence. Id.
259. Id. at 754 n.2, 785 S.E.2d at 569. The County also sought to exclude evidence of
"emotional upset" damages, however the plaintiffs' attorney conceded that the plaintiffs
were not entitled to emotional damages. Id. at 756 n.2, 785 S.E.2d at 570 n.2.
260. Id. at 754, 785 S.E.2d at 569-70.
261. Id. at 755, 785 S.E.2d at 570.
262. Id.
263. The plaintiffs sought recovery for damage to "furniture and other household items."
Id. at 756, 785 S.E.2d at 570.
264. Id. at 757, 785 S.E.2d at 571 (quoting Bowers v. Fulton Cty., 221 Ga. 731, 737, 146
S.E.2d 884 (1966)).
265. Id. at 759, 785 S.E.2d at 572.
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damages." 266 Finally, the court of appeals agreed with the plaintiffs that
the trial court erroneously excluded the plaintiffs' evidence on their claim
for attorney fees, holding that, while attorney fees are not a recoverable
element of damages for an inverse condemnation claim alone, 267 attorney
fees under O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11268 "may be recoverable in an inverse condemnation proceeding." 269
XIII. ANNEXATION

The Georgia Court of Appeals provided insight into what constitutes
"substantial compliance" with the procedural requirements for annexation in City of Lovejoy v. Clayton County.270 In response to an application
for annexation of an approximately ten-acre parcel owned by the applicant pursuant to the "60% Rule," 271 the City of Lovejoy began the annex-

ation process. 272 Eventually, the City adopted an ordinance annexing, not
just the ten-acre parcel, but also six other parcels (bringing the total annexation to approximately fifteen acres). Arguing that the City's annexation did not comply with the statutory notice requirements, the County
filed a suit seeking a declaration that the annexation was void. 273 Acknowledging that substantial compliance is the appropriate standard for
review of the City's compliance with the annexation procedures, 274 the
court reviewed in detail the timeline of events and specific language used
in various notices provided by the City. 275 Based on the facts presented,
the court of appeals concluded that the City failed to substantially comply
with the notice requirements of the annexation statute. 276 Key to the
court's conclusion was that the owners of the six additional parcels received no notice of the City's intent to annex the parcels prior to the public hearing on the annexation, which the court determined to be an absolute requirement in order to satisfy O.C.G.A. § 36-36-36(a). 277 Without
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Id. at 759, 785 S.E.2d at 573.
O.C.G.A. § 13-6-11 (2010).
Pribeagu, 336 Ga. App. at 758, 785 S.E.2d at 573.
335 Ga. App. 881, 783 S.E.2d 395 (2016).
O.C.G.A. § 36-36-30 (2012).
Lovejoy, 335 Ga. App. at 882, 783 S.E.2d at 395.
Id. at 883, 783 S.E.2d at 396.
Id. at 884, 783 S.E.2d at 397.
Id. at 882-83, 783 S.E.2d at 395-96.
Id. at 885, 783 S.E.2d at 397.
O.C.G.A. § 36-36-36(a) (2012); Lovejoy, 335 Ga. App. at 885, 783 S.E.2d at 397.
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actual pre-hearing notice of the public hearing, there could be no substantial compliance with the notice requirements and the annexation
was declared "null and void." 278

278. Lovejoy, 335 Ga. App. at 885, 783 S.E.2d at 397.
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